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 In his 1955-’56 seminar on psychosis, which was primarily devoted to an intricate 
analysis of Freud’s case-study of the memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber, Lacan at one 
point invited his listeners to contemplate the possibility of their being suddenly 
overcome, at the end of a stormy and tiring day, by a peculiar subjective experience 
which expresses itself in the thought of “the peace of the evening [la paix du soir]”. What 
is the relation, Lacan asked, between this symbolic expression and the experiential 
condition associated with it? What does “the peace of the evening” mean to the subject 
who is unexpectedly and quite involuntarily overcome by the thought? What exactly does 
the thought capture? What, if anything, does it point towards? 
 For Maria Balaska, Lacan’s lyrical example of the problematic relationship 
between words and things, between thinking and being, between essence and existence, 
constitutes a paradigmatic instance of what she terms ‘astonishment’ – an affective state 
of mind in which the subject experiences words as fundamentally falling short of the 
reality in which the subject is embedded and which the words are meant to convey. In a 
similar vein, she identifies its occurrence in Wittgenstein’s famous 1929 ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’ before the Cambridge ‘Heretics Society’, notably at the point where the 
philosopher highlighted the disparity between ethics (as the realm of ‘supernatural’ value 
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judgments) and language (as the container of ‘natural’, factual meaning), which would 
render it impossible for human beings to express absolute value judgments with a 
symbolic tool that is only suitable for rendering absolute facts. Lacan’s example was 
distinctly different from Wittgenstein’s insistence on the intrinsic inadequacy of language, 
if only because Lacan was not at all concerned (just yet) with the question of ethics, yet 
for Balaska they represent comparable moments of ‘astonishment’, because the meaning 
relayed by the linguistic statements or thought processes does not de facto match the 
quality of the experience that it is intended to invoke. 
 Why should we call this insuperable gap between thinking and being 
‘astonishment’, especially since neither Wittgenstein nor Lacan designated it as such? In 
an endnote to her first chapter, Balaska concedes that she could have decided to refer to 
it as ‘experiences of absolute value’, yet that ‘absolute value’ carries unwanted 
“conceptual baggage” and “fails to address the affective element of the experience” (p. 12, 
note 2). It is a valid point, but it does not justify her choice for ‘astonishment’ rather than 
‘despair’, ‘frustration’, ‘exasperation’, ‘dismay’ or ‘surprise’. In his 1804-’05 ‘Lectures on the 
Study of Science’ (Vorlesungen zur Wissenschaftslehre), Fichte referred to this 
irreducible void between the particular and the universal, between the empirical and the 
transcendental, between the quid facti and the quid juris, as the ‘hiatus irrationalis’, and 
he did not hesitate to call the typical sentiment of this ‘transcendental abyss’ in which 
human existence is thrown as a state of anguish. Of course, the choice of terminology 
and the fervent search for other, presumably better and more precise alternatives, is in 
itself an illustration of the problem that is being exposed: words invariably carry 
meaning, but the meaning they carry is never – nor can it be – a completely accurate 
representation of the subject’s lived experience or the concrete experiential reality it is 
trying to domesticate and make sense of. When Lacan conjured up the image of “the 
peace of the evening”, he mainly intended to exemplify how psychotic patients experience 
the antinomy between meaning and being in a radically different way, up to the point 
where for them meaning becomes being in itself. When Wittgenstein entered the 
philosophical quagmire of ethics (value judgements), he mainly wanted to argue that 
something in the nature of language makes it next to impossible for human beings to 
formulate statements about the difference between good and bad in an absolute, factual 
way, so that it may be better not to talk about ethics at all. Whereas Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic conception of language (the symbolic order, the Other) during the 1950s 
was radically different from Wittgenstein’s analytical outlook on the logical structure of 
propositions in the Tractatus, both men emphasized the limits of representation and the 
limitations of its semantic spectrum for making sense of issues, events and experiences 
that fundamentally reside outside its direct sphere of influence. 
 Contrary to what its title may suggest, or what some readers might expect, 
Balaska’s book does not offer a Lacanian reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophical position 
with regard to ‘astonishment’. Nor is it an attempt to recuperate Wittgenstein’s outlook on 
language and the ineffable within a Lacanian psychoanalytic framework. As one of the 
most philosophically minded psychoanalysts of his generation, Lacan was definitely 
familiar with Wittgenstein’s work, at least with the Tractatus, even at a time when 
Wittgenstein’s reception in France was still in its infancy, and long before the first French 
translation of the Tractatus would see the light of day. On at least two occasions, Lacan 
even recommended to his audience that they read Wittgenstein’s seminal treatise, and it 
would be worthwhile to examine how and why Lacan felt that he could elevate 
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Wittgenstein above the “insipid and mediocre considerations” of logical-positivism, but 
this is not where Balaska’s interest lies. In a sense, this is one of the many strengths of 
this book, because it effectively allows the author to stage an original cross-fertilisation 
between the two thinkers, whereby the one is never reduced to or criticized in light of the 
other, but both are valued equally in their singular, ostensibly contradictory, yet 
ultimately reconcilable attempts at addressing the experience of ‘astonishment’. Truth be 
told, amongst all the scholars who have dealt with the ‘transcendental abyss’ over the 
past four hundred years or so, Wittgenstein and Lacan do not particularly stand out for 
their detailed, in-depth consideration of the problem, especially not in their published 
works. However, this gives Balaska another reason for trying to articulate a new way out 
of the deadlock, which exceeds the boundaries of the two classic responses to it, and 
which is significant philosophically as well as psychoanalytically, theoretically as well as 
clinically. 
 Rephrasing the question of ‘astonishment’ as the “groundlessness of meaning” (p. 
18), she cogently explains how the ‘hiatus irrationalis’ has traditionally been superseded 
in one of two, fundamentally incompatible, philosophical and epistemological ‘deflections’, 
the latter term having been borrowed from Cora Diamond in order to indicate how each 
approach entails a radical refusal to engage directly with the ‘abyss’. On the one hand, 
philosophers have routinely had recourse to metaphysical speculations, often derived 
from German idealism, about the pre-existence of a ground ‘beyond meaning and reality’, 
not dissimilar to how Descartes, in his Metaphysical Meditations, would reintroduce God 
as the final guarantee for the veracity of his expositions on the relationship between 
thinking and being. On the other hand, within a strictly empiricist framework, analytical 
philosophers and those underscoring the crucial significance of the logical structure of 
linguistic propositions, such as Wittgenstein himself, have argued that the gap between 
thinking and being can be narrowed, and that the truth-value of statements can be 
legitimised, if absolute priority is given to a rational-scientific investigation of external 
reality. By contrast with the metaphysicians, the correspondence between the concept 
and the thing (the famous adaequatio rei et intellectus) is guaranteed, here, on the basis 
of a carefully designed scientific method and the employment of language as a natural, 
factual tool of description. 
 For Balaska, neither of these two conventional approaches to ‘astonishment’ are 
particularly adequate, because in all their differences they both constitute no more than a 
spurious refusal to ascertain the potentially creative force that lies within the abyss 
itself, irrespective of the fact that, in the empiricist deflection, evidence is but a false 
name for probability, and that so-called facts can never re-emerge outside the fictional 
structures of meaning. Instead of adhering to the metaphysical or the empiricist 
deflection, Balaska argues persuasively that ‘astonishment’ should be embraced as a 
generative source of ‘reflection’, which does require the subject to take responsibility for 
the inadequacy of his or her own words, but which opens a space for creative (self-
)enrichment. Drawing on a highly original, combined reading of Wittgenstein and Lacan, 
Balaska calls this subjective stance of reflection an ethical experience, which she defines 
as a creative involvement with meaning, against the abstract metaphysical ruminations of 
the German idealists and the equally sterile, formalistic propositions of analytic 
philosophy. 
 At this point, I was somehow expecting the author to return to Nietzsche, yet to my 
own ‘astonishment’, she prefers to elaborate on the subject’s creative exploration of the 
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abyss with what I can only describe as a certain humanistic philosophy of individuation, 
harmonisation and self-integration. At this point, we have left Wittgenstein behind and 
are firmly into Lacanian clinical-psychoanalytic terrain, even though the author tends to 
make abstraction of the difference between Lacan’s general theory of the (split, divided) 
subject, and his yearlong explorations of the direction (aims, goals, objectives) and the 
ethics of a psychoanalytic treatment process. From the vantage point of the latter, it is 
patently true that for the early Lacan, who delivered his seminar at Sainte-Anne Hospital 
in Paris to psychoanalytic trainees between 1953 and 1963, psychoanalytic interpretation 
entails an act of deciphering, and that clinical practice must be geared towards a 
reintegration of the patient’s history and a re-calibration of the symbolic in favour of the 
emergence of new, less problematic meanings. Hence, the early Lacan tends to perform 
a delicate balancing act between hermeneutics and humanism. However, during the early 
1960s Lacan came to realise that this perspective on the analytic act may merely replace 
one pathological meaning with another, equally symptomatic meaning, with the added 
complication that the latter is derived from the analytic process itself and may thus newly 
condemn the patient to another, iatro- or analytico-genic cage. In other words, I am not 
convinced that Balaska’s reading of the ethical response to the abyss as an act of self-
becoming, which constitutes an “individuated involvement with meaning” and a “more 
integrated existence through the appropriation of those signifiers (and the reality they 
carry) that are closed up” (p. 147), is as emancipatory as she would like it to be. Apart 
from the fact that it is quite irreconcilable with the late Lacan (and maybe also, to some 
extent, with the late Wittgenstein), I am not at all sure this way of dealing with the 
experience of ‘astonishment’ would be less illusory, more liberating, less ‘deflective’, 
more ethical than the conventional responses which, by way of shorthand, we might also 
designate as ‘a belief in God’ or ‘a reliance on science’. Lacan himself gradually 
acknowledged that the good life is not at all tantamount to a creative involvement with 
meaning, with a view to self-becoming. If anything, it slowly dawned upon him that it was 
exactly the opposite, notably that the subject’s capacity for living well is directly 
proportional to his or her ability to abandon the islands of meaningful knowledge and 
venture out onto the oceans of absolute nonsense. 
 My own reservations as to Balaska’s conclusions aside, this is a carefully crafted, 
well-written and altogether fascinating book, which is deserving of a wide readership. It 
may seem paradoxical, given the subject matter, but the author’s language is remarkably 
clear and precise, and the ideas are invariably presented in a transparent, systematic and 
logical series of arguments, which are consistently reader-friendly. Neither the 
Wittgenstein nor the Lacan in the book’s title should stop anyone from engaging with the 
text, because no extensive prior knowledge of both authors is presumed and each of the 
chapters contains just the right amount of recapitulation for the reader to find his or her 
bearings and follow the author on her intellectual journey. I am already looking forward 
to seeing where it will take her next. 
   
 
